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ABSTRACT 
Socially responsible firms are expected by European regulators to create shared value for their 
shareholders, their stakeholders and society. Yet how to generate profits while providing 
public good is still academically debated. This paper argues that corporate social 
responsibility encompasses many diversified policies with variant effects on profitability. 
Which policy most matters economically? As theoretical guidance lacks, this 
multidimensional puzzle typically encounters model uncertainty. To account for it, model 
averaging is presented and applied to a unique database matching the economic and social 
performances of large European firms. Results support that socially responsible corporate 
policies do not equally matter to do well and do good. In particular, good business behaviors 
with customers and suppliers appear core. Strong support is also brought to the co-existence 
of policies monotonically related to profitability (human resources) and policies with an 
optimal level (environmental policies). Consequences for business and policy makers are 
discussed.  
 
RESUME 
Pour les régulateurs européens, les entreprises socialement responsables créent de la valeur 
pour leurs actionnaires, leurs parties prenantes et la société. Toutefois, comment générer du 
profit tout en fournissant du bien public est débattu académiquement. Cet article soutient que 
la responsabilité sociale des entreprises englobe des politiques diverses aux effets variables. 
Laquelle compte le plus économiquement ? Ce puzzle multidimensionnel se heurte en 
l’absence de théorie unifiée à une incertitude de modèle. Pour la traiter, la moyennisation de 
modèles est appliquée à une base de données originale associant performances économique et 
sociale des grandes entreprises européennes. Les résultats montrent que les politiques de 
responsabilité sociale n’équivalent pas pour réussir économiquement et socialement. Les 
bonnes pratiques commerciales envers les clients et fournisseurs apparaissent centrales. Des 
pratiques monotonement liées au profit (ressources humaines) coexistent avec des politiques 
présentant un optimum (environnement). Les conséquences pour les entreprises et les 
pouvoirs publics sont discutées. 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY WORDS: corporate social responsibility; firm performance; model averaging; model 
uncertainty. 
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I.  Introduction 
According to the European Commission (2011), a ‘socially responsible’ firm takes 
responsibility for its impact on society beyond legal constraints. More precisely, the promoted 
socially responsible firm should integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and 
consumer concerns into its business operations and core strategy with a double aim: 
maximizing the creation of shared value for its shareholders, stakeholders and society; and 
identifying, preventing and mitigating its possible adverse impact. Corporate Social 
Responsibility (labeled CSR hereafter) hence amounts to firms privately providing public 
good and reducing their negative externalities. Decades of active academic debate cover the 
ground between such a definition and Friedman’s famous New York Times Magazine article 
title, back in 1970: ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ 
(FRIEDMAN [1970]). Most research developed the argument along which a firm providing 
public good might neither be sacrificing profits nor, as put by Friedman, doing ‘hypocritical 
window-dressing’, but rather creating value on the long run. 
 Indeed, a large corpus of empirical literature tested over the last three decades the link 
between firm financial performance and social performance (see for literature surveys 
ORLITZKY et al. [2003]; MARGOLIS and WALSH [2003]; PORTNEY [2008]). In the most 
extensive survey and meta-analysis up-to-date, MARGOLIS et al. [2009] conclude that 
corporate social performance has a small, positive and significant effect on corporate financial 
performance and that it does not destroy shareholder value. However, the mechanisms behind 
this relationship are complex and not well understood. Thus many scholars along these 
authors, such as HORVÁTHOVÁ [2010] and SURROCA et al. [2010], underline the need to 
investigate further how organizations can succeed in both economically “doing well” and 
socially “doing good”.  
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 Imagine a firm manager whose task precisely is to succeed in “doing well and doing 
good”, or, put in the European Commission words, to create shared value for its shareholders, 
stakeholders and society. Hereby her job consists in the selection and implementation of 
corporate policies both generating profits and providing public good (or reducing a social ill). 
Such policies might encompass highly diversified actions, for instance: investment in 
pollution abatement processes; publication of a sustainable development report; non 
discrimination in the workplace; or donations to local charities. Of course, each policy will 
differently impact society. CSR is thus in essence a multidimensional construct (CARROLL 
[1979]; WOOD [1991]).  
 The few empirical analyses tackling the multidimensional nature of CSR 
simultaneously estimate the effects of different clusters of policies on firm performance and 
find that they diverge. HILLMAN and KEIM [2001] distinguish direct stakeholders 
management, positively related to financial performance, from social issues, negatively 
linked. BRAMMER et al. [2006] observe that environment and local community involvement 
appear negatively correlated with financial performance, whereas human resources are weakly 
positively linked. Using panel data and a supermodularity approach, CAVACO and CRIFO 
[2010] even observe the existence of a complementarity premium on specific CSR 
dimensions (human resources and business behavior towards customers and suppliers), while 
other practices are relative substitutes (environment and business behaviors). Hereby, to 
understand how firms can profit from socially responsible policies, it appears core to consider 
their specific effects.  
 This paper argues that it is also essential to understand the relative effects of the 
multiple dimensions encompassed in the CSR concept, that is, to understand the relative 
importance of those policies for firm economic performance. Among the wide range of 
socially responsible policies, which most matter economically? This question is crucial for 
Doing Well and Doing Good: A Multidimensional Puzzle 
5 
shareholders, but also for firm stakeholders and society as it is likely to impact the type of 
public good provided by the firm.   
 
 Yet such a multidimensional puzzle is not trivial to solve. This paper highlights that it 
typically encounters several dimensions of model uncertainty, namely theory, data and 
specification uncertainty (DOPPELHOFER and WEEKS [2009]), which have not been dealt 
with so far in the literature.  
 Theory uncertainty arises as theoretical guidance is lacking to predict the relative 
importance and effects of CSR dimensions for financial performance. Indeed, most theoretical 
work either analyzes CSR as a whole (e.g. CESPA and CESTONE [2007]; BARON [2009]) 
or focuses on one specific dimension (e.g. environment in SINCLAIR DESGAGNÉ and 
GOZLAN [2003]). However, depending on the policies considered, diverging effects are 
observed (e.g. BRAMMER et al. [2006]) and we lack predictions on which effect is likely to 
dominate. For instance, differentiating products based on environmental attributes might 
create a market opportunity (PORTER and VAN DER LINDE [1995]) while generating a 
perquisite for managers who like the accolades of environmentalists, creating agency costs 
(BARON et al. [2009]). BROCK and DURLAUF [2001] refer to this ambiguity as the open-
endedness of theories: one causal theory being true does not imply the falsity of another. 
 Data uncertainty also plagues the relationships between social and financial 
performances, as a wide range of variables have been used to evaluate the former. Mirroring 
this uncertainty, MARGOLIS et al. [2009] identify nine measurements used by researchers to 
account for CSR, including charitable contributions, environmental performance, revealed 
misdeeds or self reported social performance. Missing observations and measurement errors 
also contribute to data uncertainty. 
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 Finally, specification uncertainty arises as researchers are uncertain about the best 
empirical specification to explain financial performance. Omitted variable drawbacks have 
already been pointed out by several authors (MCWILLIAMS and SIEGEL [2000]; 
JOHNSON et al. [2009]). Moreover, whereas most literature investigated a monotonic 
relationship between social and financial performances, BARNETT and SALOMON [2006] 
made instead a strong case of a hump-shape relationship, thus unveiling the existence of an 
optimal level of CSR to be reached.  
 
 Ignoring model uncertainty generally results in biased parameter estimates, 
overconfident standard errors and misleading inference (DOPPELHOFER [2008]). Hereby 
this paper sets out to tackle model uncertainty in the “doing well” and “doing good” debate 
and to acknowledge the multidimensional nature of CSR. To do so, it introduces in the 
literature a formal statistical framework that explicitly accounts for model uncertainty, namely 
model averaging. Model averaging was designed to specifically address model uncertainty by 
simultaneously weighing evidence for multiple models depicting alternative working 
hypotheses (DOPPELHOFER [2008]). It allows researchers to examine all possible models, 
to weigh each model according to quality, and to provide a probability distribution for each 
coefficient estimate (EICHER et al. [2012]).  
 This powerful technique has already proven insightful in several research fields 
hampered by model uncertainty, such as growth economics (SALA-I-MARTIN et al. [2004]), 
macroeconomic forecasts (WRIGHT [2008]), policy evaluation (BROCK and DURLAUF 
[2007]) and finance (PESARAN et al. [2009]). Other fields of applications include trade 
flows (EICHER et al. [2012]), labour economics (TOBIAS and LI [2004]) and health 
economics (JACKSON et al. [2009]). 
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 Various methodologies have been proposed to succeed in implementing model 
averaging. This paper develops an approach built on information-theoretic model averaging 
and thick modelling (as proposed by KAPETANIOS et al. [2008] and PESARAN et al. 
[2009]). In particular, corrected Akaike Information Criteria model averaging (AICc MA) and 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria model averaging (SIC MA) are discussed. Beyond 
their original application to the CSR literature, these methods have the potentiality to be 
relevant to many empirical economists for their relevancy and their straightforward 
implementation. They are here applied to a database that matches the economic performance 
of 461 large European firms over the 1998-2007 period with CSR measures provided by the 
non-financial rating agency Vigeo. This original data enables the study of a fairly complete 
range of socially responsible corporate policies, namely: environmental policy, good business 
behavior with customers and suppliers, implication in local communities, human resources 
management and governance.  
 The introduction of model averaging in the “doing well” and “doing good” debate 
brings novel and robust results. First, it unveils the composition of profitably-linked CSR. 
This composition appears heterogeneous, with different CSR dimensions having different 
importance. In particular, good business behavior with customers and suppliers are shown to 
remain crucial. Results also provide strong evidence of the coexistence of corporate policies 
monotonically linked to economic performance (human resources management) and policies 
with optimal levels (environment), hence reconciling competing theories. Consequences for 
corporations and policy makers are discussed. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodology. 
Section 3 presents data. Section 4 displays results and discusses main findings. Section 5 
concludes. 
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II.  Methodology 
This section first presents the basic empirical framework to study the link between CSR and 
financial performance, before introducing model averaging and thick modelling. Finally, it 
discusses their inputs and limits. 
 
II.1  Basic Empirical Framework 
 
Following previous literature (ORLITZKY et al. [2003]; MARGOLIS et al. [2009]), the basic 
model to estimate the link between firm performance and CSR is as follows:  
                                                                 
                                                  (1) 
with i the number of firms and t the year of observation.  
      is the firm financial performance, measured in this paper either by returns on 
assets (ROA) or returns on capital employed (ROCE).        is a global CSR measure (here 
the global Vigeo rating). A standard OLS limits the disaggregation of CSR into multiple 
policies. Indeed, as CSR policies are part of a company strategy, chosen and implemented by 
the same firm manager, they are likely to show at least dome degree of multicollinearity, 
which would bias coefficients. Hence a global CSR measure is here considered with OLS. 
        is a solvability ratio control that captures the fact that the more stable a firm, 
the likelier it is to engage in CSR.        controls for firm size and is measured as the 
logarithm of net sales. Larger firms are indeed more likely to encounter major environmental 
hazards (KONAR and COHEN [1997]), to have larger resources devoted to social 
investments and to be more exposed to social pressure.        controls for research and 
development intensity. Based on a large corpus of theoretical literature linking research and 
development to long term economic performance, WADDOCK and GRAVES [1997] and 
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later on MCWILLIAMS and SIEGEL [2000] highlight its importance as a control variable. 
Risk, firm size and R&D intensity are expected to have positive estimates.  
            controls for the firm financial leverage (debt-to-equity ratio) and 
provides a good indicator of management risk tolerance, which can impact decision making 
and arbitrage between short and long term performances (WADDOCK and GRAVES 
[1997]). As such it is expected to negatively impact ROCE and ROA.  
 INDUSTRY dummies (j) are introduced because industrial processes, scale savings, 
associated pollution levels, stakeholders’ activism, exposure and financial risks are sector 
specific (MARGOLIS et al. [2009]). COUNTRY (k) is also controlled for as regulations, 
social demand and stakeholders’ pressure vary between European countries. YEAR dummies 
account for the evolution over the studied period of CSR regulation, public awareness and 
firm involvement. Finally     is the time variant error term of firm i at year t.  
 In this model, data is considered cross-sectional whereas firms count in average three 
observations over the studied period of time. Yet a panel approach taking temporality into 
account is prevented by data availability, as discussed in section II.3. Both White’s test and 
Breusch-Pagan’s test show some heteroscedasticity in the data. Hence ROGERS (1993)’s 
estimators based on clusters (firms) are used instead of standard OLS to account for 
dependent and non-identically distributed error terms. Estimates obtained with this method 
will be compared to those obtained with model averaging, now presented. 
 
II.2  Model Averaging and Thick Modelling  
 
This section presents the chosen theoretical framework of model averaging and thick 
modelling. It limits itself to discussing the properties relevant to this paper. For a 
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comprehensive discussion, the reader is referred to PESARAN et al. [2009] and 
KAPETANIOS et al. [2008]. 
 Let us start with a set of models. This set is denoted      
 
    where   is the i-th 
of the m models considered. In this paper, the space of models   consists of all the possible 
subsets of candidate regressors potentially explaining financial performance, including all five 
CSR dimensions considered. Our interest is a parameter Δ. The Bayesian framework provides 
a probability distribution for Δ given   and the observed data D. The relevant information 
data set at time t is denoted   . The probability distribution            of the parameter of 
interest over the space of models considered is given by:  
                                 
 
       (2) 
where             is the conditional probability distribution of   given a model    and the 
data   . It can easily be obtained from standard model specific analysis.           is the 
posterior probability of Mi, that is the conditional probability of the model    being the true 
model given the data   .  
 In the Bayesian Model Averaging (BAM) framework, weights used to combine the 
models under consideration are their respective posterior probabilities          . This 
approach requires specifications of the prior probability of model    and has been the focus 
of a large corpus of literature.  
 An alternative to BAM consists in approximating the weights           by 
information criteria weights, such as Akaike weights or Schwartz weigths. This approach is 
developed in KAPETANIOS et al. [2008] as the information theoretic Model Averaging, 
building on the influential work of BURNHAM and ANDERSON [2002]. Applications are 
expanding and include growth economics (WAGNER and HLOUSKOVA [2009]), finance 
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(HANSEN [2008]), tourism development (WAN and ZHANG [2009]), health economics 
(CLAESKENS et al. [2006]) and environmental economics (LAYTON and LEE [2006]).  
 
 A first weighting scheme proposed in the literature and implemented in the paper is 
based on AKAIKE’s information criteria (1973, 1974), known as AIC. AIC is defined as: 
                (3) 
 AIC has two components: the negative loglikelihood –ln (L), which measures the lack 
of model fit to the observed data, and a bias correction factor, which increases as a function of 
the number of model parameters k. More technically, this criterion is an extension of the log-
likelihood theory and is based on the Kullback–Leibler information, which can be 
conceptualized as a ‘distance’ between full reality and a model. Difference in AIC between 
two models can thus be analyzed as an estimate of the difference between the Kullback–
Leibler distance for the two models. For in-depth analysis of AIC’s theory, uses and limits, 
see KONISHI and KITAGAWA [2007].  
 AIC has been criticized for its propensity at over-fitting models, meaning that it tends 
to select too many variables. HURVICH and TSAI [1989, 1995] hence introduced the 
corrected AIC (AICc), which is AIC with a second order correction for small size samples:  
                                (4) 
with k the number of model parameters and n the number of observations. As n increases, 
AICc converges to AIC and is asymptotically efficient in both regression and times series. For 
linear regression, AICc has better bias properties than does AIC. BURNHAM and 
ANDERSON [2004] thus advocate employing AICc regardless of sample size, which is done 
in this paper. The reader can refer to MCQUARRIE and TSAI [1998] for further comparisons 
of AIC and AICc with several competitor criteria for linear regression problems.  
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 Difference between information criteria    is used to rank models. Following 
BURNHAM and ANDERSON [2002], the likelihood of the model    given the data is 
equivalent to      
 
 
 
 
  . Model likelihoods are normalized to sum up to 1 and referred to as 
Akaike weights. Akaike weight    for model   writes:  
                             
 
     (5) 
where      
 
   . wi can be interpreted as the probability of selecting model i as being the 
best if analyses were repeated using independent samples from the same population. This 
paper implements the use of corrected Akaike weights, based on AICc.  
 Let us now go back to our parameter of interest Δ. Following BURNHAM and 
ANDERSON [2002], the averaged estimate     of Δ is provided by  
            
 
    (6) 
with    the parameter of interest in model    and     the estimate of    in model   . Δ 
unconditional standard error is given by: 
                                  
  
 
         (7) 
  
 The second weighting scheme considered in this paper is based on the Schwarz 
Bayesian Information Criteria (SCHWARZ, 1978), further on SIC, defined as:  
                       (8) 
BALTAGI [2001] points out that SIC is consistent, meaning that as the sample goes to 
infinity, the probability that it will choose the correct model from a finite number of models 
goes to 1. A drawback of this property is that in small samples, SIC tends to select 
underfitting models. Consequently model selection based on SIC tends not to pick up enough 
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variables in the ‘best’ models. Hereby SIC based model averaging tends to bias downwards 
variable weights. 
 This paper considers both approaches to information-theoretic model averaging: the 
corrected Akaike weights model averaging (AICc MA) and the SIC weights model averaging 
(SIC MA). 
 
 Other weighting schemes have been discussed in the model averaging literature. 
HJORT and CLAESKENS [2003] discussed the Focused Information Criterion. HANSEN 
[2007] proposed Mallows model averaging (MMA). WAGNER and HLOUSKOVA [2009] 
compare AIC MA, SIC MA and MMA. They further introduce, for any given weighting 
scheme, the so-called inclusion weight as the classical counterpart of the Bayesian posterior 
inclusion probability of a variable.  
 
 A last refinement used in this paper is the combination of information-theoretic model 
averaging with thick modelling. As detailed in PESARAN et al. [2009], thick modelling 
consists in applying model averaging not to all of the models but only to a given number of 
top performing models. Individual models are here ranked according to the AICc or SIC 
criteria. The space of models   under consideration for model averaging is thus reduced to 
the top performing    space of models (say the top 25%). Thick modelling has been 
proposed, among others, by GRANGER and JEON [2004]. Applications include STOCK and 
WATSON [1999]’s in the context of macroeconomic time series and AIOLFI et al. [2001]’s 
on forecasts of excess returns.  
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 In this paper, the Base Model (1) is first estimated using OLS. Then AICc MA is 
applied as a benchmark to the Base Model set of variables with global CSR. As year, industry 
and country controls are kept in all models, the model population counts 2
5
= 32 possible 
models based on five variables (global CSR, Risk, Leverage, Size and R&D) and all are 
considered. In a second step, global CSR is disaggregated into five CSR dimensions 
(Environment, Business behavior towards clients and customers, Community involvement, 
Human resources and Governance). The new model population counts 2
4+5 
= 512 models and 
model averaging combined with thick modelling is done on the top 100 models based on 
AICc and SIC rankings.  
 
II.3  Inputs and Limits of the Approach  
 
This paper implements thick modelling, AICc model averaging and SIC model averaging to 
account for model uncertainty. This section discusses the inputs and limits of the approach. 
As highlighted by DOPPELHOFER [2008], the use of model averaging was limited until 
recent developments in computing power and statistical methods. Here, model fitting and 
subsequent model averaging is done thanks to the R / java glmulti package (CALCAGNO and 
DE MAZANCOURT [2010]), which renders the implementation of those tools highly 
straightforward. 
 A second input of the approach deals with the multicollinearity likely to arise when 
one considers simultaneously many dimensions of CSR, as previously discussed. 
CALCAGNO and DE MAZANCOURT [2010] found that BIC variable selection successfully 
distinguishes the effects of variables correlated at 70% (which exceeds the 62% correlation 
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between CSR dimensions observed in data here). The proposed methodology can thus help 
bypass the multicollinearity issue inherent to CSR dimensions. 
 Moreover, this paper tests for curvilinear versus monotonic relationships between the 
different CSR dimensions and financial performance. Indeed, CSR dimensions are here 
introduced as three-level factors (bellow average / average / above average). The effect of 
being above sector average on one CSR dimension is thus separately estimated from the effect 
of being bellow sector average. This paper hence tests for the existence of optimal levels and 
identifies different specifications for different CSR dimensions.  
 Limits of the tools presented are essentially given by data availability. Indeed, model 
averaging and thick modelling need large datasets for estimations to be reliable. To ensure 
sufficient data availability, it was not here possible to use data as panel data. Hence causality 
between corporate social and financial performance is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Similarly, data availability constrained control variables used in the regressions. For instance, 
advertisement intensity could not be controlled for. The relevancy of model averaging is thus 
anchored in data availability, completeness and quality and restricted to empirical fields with 
sufficient observations.  
 
III.  Data 
 
Two sources of data are matched in this research. CSR data is provided by the leading 
European extra-financial rating agency Vigeo and financial data comes from the database 
Orbis (Bureau Von Dijk). The database obtained is a non cylindrical panel. Firm is the 
primary stratification level with 1 to 8 observations per firm (3 observations in average) over 
the 1998 – 2007 time period. The sample contains 1577 observations on 461 large European 
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listed firms (restricted to 622 observations on 207 firms by the availability of data on research 
and development expenses) belonging to 13 different countries and 13 industrial sectors.  
 Vigeo measures extra-financial performance and provides firm ratings based on 
disclosed information, dialog with the firm and international or European reference 
frameworks. In particular, this paper uses data on five CSR dimensions: Environment 
(integration of environmental issues into corporate policy, product manufacturing, 
distribution, use and disposal); Governance (balanced power within the board of directors, 
respect of shareholders’ rights, remuneration of key executives and directors, audit and 
internal controls); Customers and Suppliers (respect of business integrity, including 
sustainable and transparent relationships with customers and suppliers); Community 
Involvement (integration of the firm’s impacts on local communities and responsible societal 
behavior) and Human Resources (proactive human resources corporate policy, including 
career development, continuous improvement of labour relations, quality of working 
condition). Weak multicollinearity between the ratings is assessed by variance inflation 
factors (VIF) ranging from 1.12 to 2.19 (see Table I).  
 As a starting point, this paper postulates that all five CSR dimensions equally matter. 
Consequently, a Global CSR rating is calculated as their arithmetic mean as usually done on 
such data in this literature (e.g. HILLMAN and KEIM [2001]). Secondly, CSR dimensions 
are considered separately. For the purpose of the paper, their ratings are transformed into 
three-level categorical factors: Worst (worst-in-class firms; 30%); Average (40%); and Best 
(best-in-class firms; 30%).  
 Financial measures are given in 2005 USD. Financial performance is measured by two 
accounting-based ratios: return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed (ROCE). 
ROA is the operating income divided by total assets. As such, it measures firm efficiency in 
generating income from its assets and thus indicates firm profitability, financial leverage put 
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aside. ROCE is the net operating profit after tax divided by capital employed. It thus provides 
shareholders with a comparison of earnings with capital invested in the firm.  
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table I. For a complete description of the variables and 
data, the reader can refer to the Data Appendix. 
 
TABLE I. - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Obs. Mean SD. Min. Max. VIF 
Global CSR rating 1578 2.94 3.04 1.17 4.83  
Human resources rating 1578 3.03 0.91 1.00 5.00 1.59 
Best 516 4.12 0.32 4.00 5.00  
Worst 484 1.91 0.27 1.00 2.00  
Corporate governance rating 1578 2.97 0.92 1.00 5.00 1.14 
Best 463 4.13 0.34 4.00 5.00  
Worst 498 1.86 0.35 1.00 2.00  
Customers & suppliers rating 1578 3.05 0.89 1.00 5.00 1.59 
Best 534 4.10 0.30 4.00 5.00  
Worst 472 1.93 0.26 1.00 2.00  
Community involvement rating 1578 3.07 0.95 1.00 5.00 1.46 
Best 556 4.17 0.37 4.00 5.00  
Worst 498 1.93 0.26 1.00 2.00  
Environment rating  1578 3.06 0.91 1.00 5.00 1.65 
Best 517 4.17 0.38 4.00 5.00  
Worst 475 1.92 0.28 1.00 2.00  
ROA 1577 7.86 6.81 -21.29 34.80  
ROCE 1566 14.75 11.40 -77.47 98.41  
Risk (Solvency ratio) 1578 35.54 15.86 -12.66 82.72  
Financial Leverage (Debt to equity ratio) 1578 0.79 0.99 -2.85 7.48  
R & D intensity 622 5.04 6.51 0.00 71.55  
Size (Ln(sales)) 1578 15.76 1.43 6.77 19.55  
NOTE:  
Table I presents the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables 
used. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measures multicollinearity between the ratings of the five dimensions 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) taken into account. “Best” (respectively “Worst”) indicates the ratings 
of the 30% top (bottom) firms above (under) sectoral average.  
 
 
IV.  Results 
This section first establishes result robustness by focusing on control estimates before 
presenting and discussing main findings. 
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IV.1  Results Robustness 
A specific test is needed to evaluate model averaging result robustness and variable weight 
significance. In order to do so, a permutation test (also called randomization test) is built and 
conducted. Test results give us a probability equivalent to a p-value. 1000 permutations were 
used to compute the test, meaning the smallest possible p-value obtained is 0.001.  
 As a benchmark, Base Model OLS estimates are compared with AICc MA results on 
Global CSR. Table II and Table III compare OLS results to AICc MA results for respectively 
ROA and ROCE. For both methods, the same controls are significant (for OLS) and important 
(for MA). When significant, control parameters estimated by OLS are of expected signs. In 
both samples and for both financial performance measures the control estimates are (but for 
the R&D intensity control for ROCE in full sample) in line with previous literature. The 
inclusion or not of the R&D variable little biases the estimations. 
 Then CSR is disaggregated into five dimensions. Both AICc MA and SIC MA are 
used with the five CSR dimensions on top 100 performing models (thick modelling). 
Averaged estimates are compared across both methods (AICc MA and SIC MA) and both 
financial performance measures (ROA and ROCE). Analyses are also conducted on both a 
restricted sample (with R&D control) and the full sample (without R&D control). Tables IV 
and VI respectively present AICc MA results for ROA and ROCE and can be compared with 
tables V and VII displaying SIC MA results. As SIC tends in small samples to underfit 
models, SIC MA results provide insights on which variables most matter to explain financial 
performance. For both ROA and ROCE and on both samples, AICc MA results for control 
variables are consistent in terms of estimate signs, estimate values and variable importance 
(Tables IV and VI). This consistency supports result robustness.  
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TABLE II. – OLS AND AICC MODEL AVERAGING ESTIMATIONS FOR RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) WITH GLOBAL CSR PREDICTOR 
   OLS (i)   AICc Model Averaging (ii)   
Dependent 
 Restricted sample (with R&D)  Full sample (without R&D)  Restricted sample (with 
R&D) 
 Full sample (without R&D) 
Global CSR  1.20 ** (0.56)  0.29  (0.36)  0.59 ++ (0.40)  0.25  (0.13) 
Risk   0.20 *** (0.04)  0.14 *** (0.02)  0.21 +++ (0.00)  0.22 +++ (0.00) 
Financial leverage  -0.67 * (0.36)  -0.46 ** (0.22)  -0.09  (0.04)  -0.81 ++ (0.16) 
Size  0.56  (0.36)  0.25  (0.29)  1.07  (0.10)  0.32  (0.08) 
R&D intensity  -0.03  (0.11)  No  0.10  (0.01)   No 
              
R
2
  39.45   24.83    No    No  
F-statistic  9.46 ***  7.13 ***   No    No  
Observations  622   1577   622    1577  
No. firms  207   461   207    461  
No. models  1   1   32    16  
NOTES:  
Table II compares the OLS estimations of the base model (1) explaining ROA to the AICc Model averaging results based on the set of variables used in model (1) with 
a global CSR variable. Two different samples are used in each case: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the 
R&D variable. 
(i) For OLS, figures in brackets are standard errors. P-values are corrected with Roger’s estimator. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
(ii) For AICc Model Averaging, estimates are the averaged parameter estimates (    in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. Figures in brackets are the 
unconditional variance (         in equation (7)). Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05; +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE III. - OLS AND AICC MODEL AVERAGING ESTIMATIONS FOR RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED (ROCE) WITH GLOBAL CSR PREDICTOR 
   OLS (i)   AICc Model Averaging (ii)   
Dependent 
 Restricted sample (with R&D)  Full sample (without R&D)  Restricted sample (with 
R&D) 
 Full sample (without R&D) 
Global CSR  2.11 *** (0.86)  0.60  (0.46)  1.37 +++ (1.03)  0.40  (0.13) 
Risk   0.10  (0.06)  0.03  (0.03)  0.05 ++ (0.00)  0.15 +++ (0.00) 
Financial leverage  -2.56 *** (0.82)  -2.09 *** (0.44)  -2.69 +++ (0.48)  -3.24 +++ (0.47) 
Size  0.37  (0.68)  -0.19  (0.35)  0.89  (0.33)  -0.22  (0.13) 
R&D intensity  -0.04  (0.16)  No    0.08  (0.02)  No   
                 
R
2
  32.29   16.36    No    No  
F-statistic  6.88 ***  8.00 ***   No    No  
Observations  618   1566   618    1566  
No. firms  206   457   206    457  
No. models  1   1   32    16  
NOTES:  
Table III compares the OLS estimations of the base model (1) explaining ROCE to the AICc Model averaging results based on the set of variables used in model (1) 
with a global CSR variable. Two different samples are used in each case: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without 
the R&D variable. 
 (i) For OLS, figures in brackets are standard errors. P-values are corrected with Roger’s estimator. *p<0.10;**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
(ii) For AICc MA, estimates are the averaged parameter estimates (    in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. Figures in brackets are the unconditional variance 
(         in equation (7)). Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05; +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE IV. - AICC MODEL AVERAGING RESULTS ON 100 BEST MODELS EXPLAINING RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) WITH CSR DIMENSIONS 
   Restricted sample with R&D  Restricted sample without R&D  Full sample without R&D 
Dependent : 
  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var.  
No. 
Models 
Weight 
Human 
Resources 
Best  0.48 (0.50) 50 0.57++  0.57 (0.57) 55 0.69++  -0.15 (0.09) 44 0.22 
Worst  -0.76 (0.82) 50 0.57++  -1.01 (0.93) 55 0.69++  -0.15 (0.09) 44 0.22 
Customers & 
Suppliers 
Best   0.07 (0.07) 43 0.26  0.06 (0.06) 49 0.24  -0.17 (0.31) 55 0.85++ 
Worst  -0.33 (0.33) 43 0.26  -0.29 (0.28) 49 0.24  -1.35 (0.58) 55 0.85++ 
Governance Best  0.08 (0.03) 40 0.11  0.08 (0.03) 40 0.11  0.03 (0.01) 42 0.10 
Worst  0.03 (0.02) 40 0.11  0.03 (0.01) 40 0.11  0.01 (0.00) 42 0.10 
Environment Best  -0.63 (0.75) 45 0.42  -0.64 (0.77) 45 0.42  -0.33 (0.28) 46 0.32++ 
Worst  -0.32 (0.39) 45 0.42  -0.30 (0.37) 45 0.42  -0.21 (0.15) 46 0.32++ 
Community 
Involvement 
Best  -0.04 (0.02) 38 0.09  -0.05 (0.02) 42 0.10  -0.13 (0.07) 44 0.20 
Worst  -0.04 (0.01) 38 0.09  -0.04 (0.02) 42 0.10  -0.15 (0.08) 44 0.20 
                 
Risk   0.21 (0.00) 100 1.00+++  0.21 (0.00) 100 1.00+++  0.22 (0.00) 100 1.00+++ 
Financial 
Leverage 
  -0.11 (0.05) 44 0.28+  -0.13 (0.07) 48 0.32+  -0.87 (0.15) 62 0.94++ 
Size   1.13 (0.09) 100 1.00+++  1.17 (0.10) 58 1.00+++  0.33 (0.08) 51 0.71+ 
R&D intensity   0.10 (0.01) 35 0.60  No     No    
                 
Observations   622     622     1577    
NOTES: 
Table IV presents AICc Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Assets (ROA) using CSR dimensions. Three different samples are used to 
ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; the same restricted sample without the R&D intensity variable; and the full sample 
without the R&D variable. 
“Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate (    in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (        in equation (7)). “No. 
models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05;  +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE V. - SIC MODEL AVERAGING RESULTS ON 100 BEST MODELS EXPLAINING RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) WITH CSR DIMENSIONS 
 
   Restricted sample with R&D Full sample without R&D 
Dependent :   Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight  Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight 
Human Resources Best   0.04 (0.01) 41 0.07  -0.00 (0.00) 41 0.01++ 
Worst   -0.09 (0.03) 41 0.07  -0.01 (0.00) 41 0.01++ 
Customers & Suppliers Best   0.00 (0.00) 32 0.02+  -0.02 (0.01) 44 0.13+++ 
Worst   -0.02 (0.00) 32 0.02+  -0.22 (0.15) 44 0.13+++ 
Governance Best   0.00 (0.00) 23 0.00  0.00 (0.00) 40 0.00 
Worst   0.00 (0.00) 23 0.00  -0.00 (0.00) 40 0.00 
Environment Best   -0.02 (0.00) 33 0.02++  -0.01 (0.00) 42 0.01++ 
Worst   -0.02 (0.00) 33 0.02++  -0.00 (0.00) 42 0.01++ 
Community 
Involvement 
Best   -0.00 (0.00) 26 0.00  -0.00 (0.00) 41 0.01 
Worst   -0.00 (0.00) 26 0.00  -0.01 (0.00) 41 0.01 
             
Risk    0.21 (0.00) 100 1.00+++  0.22 (0.00) 100 1.00+++ 
Financial Leverage    -0.02 (0.00) 43 0.06  -0.54 (0.27) 51 0.59+++ 
Size    1.23 (0.08) 70 1.00+++  0.17 (0.06) 48 0.35++ 
R&D intensity    0.06 (0.00) 39 0.35+++  No    
             
Observations    622     1577    
NOTES: 
Table V presents SIC Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Assets (ROA) using CSR dimensions. Two different samples are used to 
ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D variable. 
 “Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate (    in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (        in equation 
(7)). “No. models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05; +++ p<0.01. 
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TABLE VI. - AICC MODEL AVERAGING RESULTS ON 100 BEST MODELS EXPLAINING RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED (ROCE) WITH CSR 
DIMENSIONS 
   Restricted sample with R&D  Restricted sample without R&D  Full sample without R&D 
Dependent : 
  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight  Estimate Uncond. 
Var. 
No. 
Models 
Weight 
Human 
Resources 
Best  0.03 (0.08) 34 0.22+  0.03 (0.12) 45 0.28+  0.12 (0.10) 44 0.16 
Worst  -0.39 (0.50) 34 0.22+  -0.53 (0.79) 45 0.28+  -0.10 (0.09) 44 0.16 
Customers & 
Suppliers 
Best  0.27 (0.41) 46 0.41+  0.24 (0.38) 47 0.40+  -0.46 (0.91) 51 0.66+ 
Worst  -0.84 (1.49) 46 0.41+  -0.80 (1.42) 47 0.40+  -1.76 (2.47) 51 0.66+ 
Governance Best  0.12 (0.08) 28 0.11  0.13 (0.09) 38 0.12  -0.05 (0.04) 42 0.10 
Worst  0.09 (0.06) 28 0.11  0.09 (0.06) 38 0.12  0.01 (0.01) 42 0.10 
Environment Best  -0.40 (0.52) 36 0.23  -0.39 (0.50) 40 0.23  -0.88 (1.54) 47 0.40 
Worst  -0.24 (0.02) 36 0.23  -0.24 (0.31) 40 0.23  -0.42 (0.63) 47 0.40 
Community 
Involvement 
Best  0.01 (0.04) 31 0.15  0.01 (0.06) 44 0.19  -0.02 (0.03) 43 0.13 
Worst  -0.22 (0.20) 31 0.15  -0.28 (0.31) 44 0.19  -0.11 (0.07) 43 0.13 
                 
Risk   0.04 (0.00) 54 0.61+++  0.05 (0.00) 50 0.69+++  0.15 (0.00) 64 0.99+++ 
Financial 
Leverage 
  -2.69 (0.47) 100 1.00+++  -2.66 (0.50) 98 1.00+++  -3.28 (0.47) 100 1.00+++ 
Size   1.16 (0.25) 80 0.94  1.22 (0.24) 59 0.96  -0.18 (0.10) 47 0.36+ 
R&D intensity   0.12 (0.02) 44 0.53  No     No    
 
Observations   618     618     1566    
NOTES: 
Table VI presents AICc Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) using CSR dimensions. Three different samples are 
used to ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; the same restricted sample without the R&D intensity variable; and the 
full sample without the R&D variable. 
 “Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate (    in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (        in equation (7)). “No. 
models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05;  +++ p<0.01. 
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Table VII. - SIC MODEL AVERAGING RESULTS ON 100 BEST MODELS EXPLAINING RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED (ROCE) WITH CSR 
DIMENSIONS 
   Restricted sample with R&D Full sample without R&D 
Dependent :   Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight  Estimate Uncond. Var. No. Models Weight 
Human Resources Best   0.01 (0.00) 28 0.02++  -0.00 (0.00) 35 0.00 
Worst   -0.04 (0.00) 28 0.02++  -0.00 (0.00) 35 0.00 
Customers & Suppliers Best   0.03 (0.00) 35 0.04+++  -0.03 (0.00) 40 0.03+ 
Worst   -0.09 (0.03) 35 0.04+++  -0.08 (0.03) 40 0.03+ 
Governance Best   0.01 (0.00) 20 0.00  -0.00 (0.00) 32 0.00 
Worst   0.00 (0.00) 20 0.00  0.00 (0.00) 32 0.00 
Environment Best   -0.01 (0.00) 26 0.01  -0.01 (0.00) 38 0.01 
Worst   -0.02 (0.00) 26 0.01  -0.02 (0.00) 38 0.01 
Community 
Involvement 
Best   0.01 (0.00) 26 0.01++  -0.00 (0.00) 34 0.00 
Worst   -0.03 (0.00) 26 0.01++  -0.00 (0.00) 34 0.00 
             
Risk    0.02 (0.00) 49 0.27+++  0.15 (0.00) 64 0.97+++ 
Financial Leverage    -2.89 (0.43) 93 0.99+++  -3.23 (0.48) 100 1.00+++ 
Size    1.22 (0.27) 63 0.91++  -0.03 (0.00) 46 0.07 
R&D intensity    0.07 (0.01) 35 0.29  No    
             
Observations    618     1566    
NOTES: 
Table VII presents SIC Model Averaging results for the 100 best models explaining Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) using CSR dimensions. Two different 
samples are used to ensure results robustness: a sample restricted to data with R&D intensity variable available; and the full sample without the R&D variable. 
 “Estimate” is the averaged parameter estimate (    in equation (6)) produced by model averaging. “Uncond. Var” is the unconditional variance (        in equation 
(7)). “No. models” is the number of models in which a variable is present. “Weight” refers to Akaike’s weights (equation (5)). 
Weight significance is obtained by permutation test:  + p<0.10; ++ p<0.05;  +++ p<0.01. 
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IV.2  CSR Policies Do Not Equally Matter to Do Well and Do Good 
 
Let us now focus on CSR estimates. Results obtained with the Global CSR measure support 
the existence of a positive link with financial performance. Indeed, global CSR rating 
parameter is estimated to be positive and significant at the 5% level for ROA (1.20) and at 1% 
for ROCE (2.11) with standard OLS on the restricted sample only. The global CSR averaged 
estimate is also positive (0.25 to 0.59 for ROA in Table II, 0.40 to 1.37 for ROCE in Table III) 
but CSR importance (as measured by Akaike’s weight) only exceeds 0.50 for the restricted 
sample. However, further results obtained by disaggregating CSR into multiple cluster of 
policies (dimensions) show that this global positive relationship hides divergent effects. 
 To explain ROA, CSR dimensions that stand out as important variables with AICc MA 
on the full sample are Customers and Suppliers, which clearly stands out (weight 0.85, Table 
IV), weakly followed by Environment (weight 0.2, Table IV). On the restricted sample, 
important variables are Human resources (weight 0.57 to 0.69, Table IV) and more weakly 
Environment (weight 0.42, Table IV). With SIC MA, only Human Resources on the restricted 
sample and Customers and Suppliers on the full sample are not driven to null weight (Table 
V). To explain ROCE, Customers and Suppliers (weight 0.40 to 0.41, Table VI) stand out as 
the important variable both on the restricted and the full samples, weekly followed by 
Environment (weight 0.40, Table VI), particularly on the full sample. Human Resources 
comes third with a weaker effect than observed for ROA. SIC MA once again proves very 
selective but Customers and Suppliers dimension is the only CSR dimension kept.  
 Hereby a main finding of the paper is that all CSR dimensions do not equally matter to 
do well and do good. A hierarchy clearly stands out between CSR dimensions, robust and 
consistent across various samples. This hierarchy is dominated by the Customers and 
Suppliers dimension. The Human Resources and Environment dimensions appear to have a 
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significant but lesser impact. Finally, the Governance and Community Involvement 
dimensions do not seem to be linked to financial performance. Let us now focus on the 
Customers and Suppliers dimension. 
 
 
IV.3  Good Business Behaviors with Customers and Suppliers Remain Core 
 
The Customers and Suppliers CSR dimension relates to respect of customers, in terms of 
information and product safety; sustainable and transparent relationships with suppliers; and 
more generally, business integrity. This paper shows that performance along this policy 
heavily weights in the composition of profitably-linked CSR.  
 AICc MA and SIC MA both conclude that having a low performance on this CSR 
dimension is negatively linked with financial performance. However, a high level is positively 
linked with financial performance on the restricted sample (implying a monotonic 
relationship) but negatively linked on the full sample (implying a hump-shaped relationship). 
Differences between the samples are essentially twofold. First, firms of the restricted samples 
have communicated their R&D expenses, likely implying an increased transparency. Second, 
firms of the restricted sample have significantly higher global CSR rating than other firms. 
Little difference is observed in terms of industry, year or country distributions between full 
and restricted samples.  
 As early as 1995, JONES [1995] has shown that companies involved in repeated 
transactions with stakeholders on the basis of trust and cooperation are motivated to be honest, 
trustworthy and ethical because the returns to such behavior are high. Whereas it seems fairly 
intuitive that promoting good-business behaviors with suppliers and customers is likely to 
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create value, at least on the long run, few studies actually quantify it. Part of the effect of this 
CSR dimension might capture the synergies between reputation, advertising and CSR, which 
have been more studied (e.g. BROWN et al. [2006]). Disentangling consumer relationships, 
supplier relationships and advertisement effects on financial performance would thus be an 
interesting path for further research. 
 
IV.4  Coexistence of CSR Policies With and Without Optimal Level 
 
The second major finding of this paper is the coexistence of CSR policies monotonically 
linked to profitability and of CSR policies with optimal levels. 
 On the one hand, a monotonic relationship is found between the Human Resources 
variable and financial performance. This dimension here refers to a proactive human resources 
corporate policy, including career development, continuous improvement of labour relations 
and quality of working conditions. Being worst-in-class is found to be negatively linked with 
financial performance whereas being best-in-class in positively related, indicating a 
monotonic relationship. This finding is in line with previous works showing that human 
resources policies can help recruiting motivated employees with team work values, securing 
firm survival and long-term performance (BREKKE and NYBORG [2008]) and reducing 
costly employee turnover (PORTNEY [2008]). Empirically, similar findings are made by 
GALBREATH [2006] who studies employee treatment in 38 top Australian firms; JONES and 
MURRELL [2001] who focus on the stock returns of the 51 firms included in the ‘Working 
mother’ list; and BRAMMER et al. [2006], who use the stock returns on the UK market.  
 On the other hand, a curvilinear relationship between financial performance and the 
Environment dimension is found on all samples, for both financial performance measures and 
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with both methods. The Environment dimension here encompasses the integration of 
environmental issues into corporate policy, product manufacturing, distribution, use and 
disposal. Contrary to the Human Resources dimension, the Environment dimension hence 
presents an optimum level to be reached. 
 This finding is a major step in the CSR literature as it reconciles divergent studies such 
as DERWALL et al. [2005], who find a positive link between corporate environmental 
policies and financial performance, and BRAMMER et al. [2006]’s, who found a negative 
link. In line with BARNETT and SALOMON [2006], who made a strong case for a 
curvilinear relationship, results here point out that the effect of environment policies on 
corporate performance depends of the level considered. A step further, our findings highlight 
that this curvilinear versus monotonic relationship depends on the CSR dimension considered. 
Indeed, the optimum appears fairly specific to environmental issues, as it not found on the 
Human Resources dimension. Qualifying in more details those relationships by focusing on 
causality with panel data would appear as a promising extension of this research.  
 
IV.5  Implications for Corporations Seeking to Do Well and Do Good and For Public 
Policies 
 
Clearly, this paper results do not imply that to succeed in being socially responsible and 
“doing well” and “doing good” a firm should heavily invest on its business behavior towards 
its customers and suppliers, improve its human resources policies, cut down its environmental 
performance and drop all policies regarding its community involvement and governance. 
Indeed, several limits of this study have been acknowledged, starting with the causality 
between CSR dimensions and financial performance, which ought to be the focus of further 
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work. Indeed, long-term effects of socially responsible policies and reverse causality are here 
bypassed. For instance, being proactive in environmental policies might be costly at year t and 
only possible for firms with excess cash-flows. However, this environmental policy might be 
well communicated to customers, which might then be willing to pay more for the firm 
product at year t+1. Supporting the existence of interactions between CSR dimensions, 
CAVACO and CRIFO [2010] found complementarities between good business behaviors and 
proactive human resources policy, but substitutability between the latter and environmental 
performance. 
 However, this paper establishes that CSR is a heterogeneous construct: policies 
encompassed in this wide concept have different effects on corporations’ economic 
performance; some bear optimum levels (environment) while others don’t (human resources); 
some have little impact (governance) while others weight significantly on the accounting 
ratios (good business behaviors). Hereby CSR does not come as a bundle to be bluntly 
promoted. Instead, at the corporation level, it calls for a strategic analysis of the firm’s 
business model in order to carefully select the appropriate CSR policy mix, with a special 
attention to business integrity towards customers and suppliers.  
 In terms of public policies, results highlight that for CSR to become a mainstay of the 
Europe 2020 sustainable development strategy, it needs to be detailed at an implementable 
policy level, as different policies have diverging effects. It also needs to be built with 
corporations, as they are core actors to identify which dimensions of CSR can penalize their 
profitability and which are more relevant to create shared value. In particular, these paper 
findings suggest that policies targeting the supply chain and customers are more likely to be 
successfully seized by firms as they directly impact profitability. Conversely, since an 
optimum level has been found for the environmental performance, high levels of performance 
along this dimension might be harder to reach by voluntary corporate policies.  
Doing Well and Doing Good: A Multidimensional Puzzle 
30 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the question of how corporations can profitably become “socially 
responsible”, as defined and promoted by the European Commission. It highlights that this 
issue constitutes a multidimensional puzzle hampered by model uncertainty. To solve it, it 
introduces model averaging in the literature. 
 This powerful tool unveils the composition of corporate policies that matter for 
profitability. Good business behaviors with customers and suppliers appear to dominate this 
composition. Strong evidence is also provided on the co-existence of policies with optimal 
level for financial performance and monotonic policies. In particular, a monotonic relationship 
is found for human resources management and a hump-shaped relationship for environmental 
policies, supporting the existence of an optimal level of environmental performance to be 
reached by corporations.  
 This research opens a new path to better analyze drivers of how firms can do well and 
do good. Further work taking into account temporality and causality is still needed before 
providing reliable CSR strategy advice to organizations seeking to profitably adhere to the 
principles of CSR. However, this paper findings highlight that firms do not necessarily have 
interest to promote all CSR dimensions to create value for their shareholders. This result raises 
questions in terms of the value shared with stakeholders and society and the public good 
effectively provided. Hereby, further research paths could cover the social side of the 
equation. In particular, little is known about the type and efficiency of the public good 
privately provided by corporations under the impulse of public policies.  
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DATA APPENDIX 
Corporate Social Responsibility Data 
Vigeo ratings on five CSR dimensions are used in this paper: environmental policy rating 
(Environment), corporate governance (Governance), human resources management (human 
resources), involvement in local communities (Community involvement) and business 
behaviors towards customers and suppliers (Customers & suppliers). 
Vigeo identifies CSR issues by sector and, for each CSR dimension, specific criteria are 
selected and weighted according to: CSR type and impact on sector stakeholders; 
stakeholders’ impact exposure; and finally sector risks if the impact is not correctly managed.  
Vigeo then rates firm performance on CSR dimensions in terms of leadership, implementation 
and results. A final score is calculated by firm for each dimension on a 0 (minimum) to 100 
(maximum) scale.  
For firms to be comparable across sectors, firm scores are benchmarked against their sector 
average score. The resulting rating is provided on a five-level scale: ‘worst-in-class’ (5%), 
‘below sector average’ (25%), ‘in the sector average’ (40%), ‘proactive’ (25%) and ‘best-in-
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class’ (5%). For the purpose of this paper, whose methodology requires sufficient 
observations per category, those ratings are quantified into a three-level scale: worst (bellow 
sector average; 30%); average (40%); best (above sector average).  
As Vigeo systematically rates the DJ Stoxx 600 firms (largest listed European firms), there is 
no bias selection in data. Academic work based on Vigeo’s data is still scarce (CAVACO and 
CRIFO [2010]) and promising, notably because it allows researchers to study the European 
market whereas most previous studies focused on the United States market. 
Financial Data 
Financial performance and control variables data come from the Bureau Von Dijk’s Orbis 
global database, which is sourced from many different providers. All financial measures are 
given in 2005 United States dollars and observations with unconsolidated accounting data and 
more than one subsidiary were not kept. Control for outliers is done by winsorizing at the 2% 
and 98 % levels ROA and ROCE. 
In full sample (not restricted to R&D intensity data availability), firms belong to 17 different 
countries and 14 industrial sectors (see Table A1).  
Pearson correlation coefficients can be found in Table A2. 
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TABLE A1.-  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS PER COUNTRY GROUP AND INDUSTRY (FULL SAMPLE) 
Variable  ROA  ROCE  Global CSR rating 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 12 8.21 2.97  12 14.16 3.82  12 2.49 0.56 
Belgium 42 8.82 6.26  44 18.01 13.49  44 2.66 0.55 
Denmark 25 10.14 7.62  25 15.68 9.59  25 2.82 0.91 
Finland 42 10.67 7.44  42 19.09 12.95  42 3.29 0.66 
France 430 6.64 6.52  416 12.87 9.51  416 3.11 0.62 
            
Germany 189 6.80 6.77  191 13.25 10.13  191 3.14 0.61 
Greece 9 10.01 7.16  9 14.05 9.14  9 2.11 0.62 
Ireland  27 6.90 5.84  27 12.25 7.33  27 2.48 0.76 
Italy 68 8.38 6.51  65 16.46 12.55  65 2.66 0.62 
Luxembourg 11 5.64 8.35  11 9.71 11.67  11 3.13 0.75 
            
Netherlands 126 6.16 5.85  126 11.91 10.95  126 3.14 0.57 
Norway 17 12.65 9.93  18 20.43 14.27  18 3.06 0.45 
Portugal 20 6.21 2.26  20 12.50 4.22  20 2.63 0.46 
Spain 96 7.17 6.40  94 13.97 15.74  94 2.72 0.62 
Sweden 52 8.61 7.41  55 16.86 12.58  55 2.92 0.61 
            
Switzerland 70 9.91 6.07  71 16.08 8.84  71 2.80 0.72 
UK 341 9.46 7.16  340 17.07 12.58  340 3.24 0.63 
Car Industry 82 4.64 4.04  83 10.86 8.45  83 3.09 0.64 
Trade 129 8.34 7.16  129 17.48 13.07  129 3.06 0.61 
Consumer goods 287 10.94 6.91  285 18.99 10.96  285 3.04 0.68 
            
Building 67 6.26 4.62  65 14.65 8.10  65 2.97 0.72 
Energy 163 7.95 6.11  161 14.23 10.10  161 3.08 0.63 
Equipment 84 7.62 5.99  83 15.86 13.52  83 3.04 0.67 
Finance 58 7.53 6.00  58 12.47 7.92  58 3.09 0.66 
Hotel industry 54 4.75 4.59  54 10.22 6.46  54 3.05 0.61 
            
Agri-food  91 9.01 4.53  91 16.92 7.58  91 3.03 0.66 
Intermediate 196 7.76 6.01  196 13.03 8.29  196 3.05 0.68 
ITC 148 7.35 10.24  143 13.74 16.31  143 2.99 0.67 
Media 43 7.79 7.26  39 14.47 10.08  39 2.91 0.66 
Telecom 76 5.09 7.57  80 9.31 17.39  80 3.02 0.64 
Transport 99 5.98 4.33  99 12.21 6.86  99 3.07 0.72 
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TABLE A2.-  PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 CSR 
Human 
Resources 
Governance 
Customers & 
Suppliers 
Community 
Involvement 
Environment ROA ROCE Risk. 
Financial 
leverage 
R&D 
intensity 
Size  
Global CSR 1.00            
Human Resources 0.76 1.00           
Governance 0.56 0.24 1.00          
Customers & 
Suppliers 0.76 0.49 0.32 1.00         
Community 
Involvement 0.73 0.45 0.24 0.44 1.00        
Environment 0.76 0.52 0.25 0.50 0.48 1.00       
ROA 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 1.00      
ROCE 
-
0.01 -0.00 0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.45 1.00     
Risk. 
-
0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.37 -0.01 1.00    
Financial leverage 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.27 -0.11 -0.55 1.00   
R&D intensity 
-
0.01 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.31 -0.09 1.00  
Size 0.34 0.23 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.28 -0.09 -0.02 -0.33 0.03 -0.22 1.00 
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